“So then it does not
depend on the man who wills or the man who runs, but on
God who has mercy.” (Romans 9:16)
“Whatever the Lord pleases, He does, In heaven and in
earth, in the seas and in all deeps.” (Psalm 135:6)
Questions from readers prompt
the writing of many CIC articles. The most frequently asked
question that I have not addressed until now concerns free
will. I thoroughly researched this topic nearly ten years
ago. The reason for the delay is the complexity of the
topic. Given, however, that the question continues to be
asked, I shall address it now.
Dear readers, be warned in advance that the irreducible
complexity of the topic will make this article difficult for
many to follow. If you are a new reader, please be patient,
this is not standard fare on these pages. To help those who
have difficulty digesting philosophical arguments, I have
provided summary statements at the end of sections. Feel
free to skip forward to those summary statements if you see
fit.
Please realize that free will is more of a philosophical
concept than a theological one, though it has theological
implications. However, I often see well meaning Christians
misled by certain teachers who make their own understanding
of free will a test for orthodoxy. I think this is
unfortunate and confusing. If the following discussion does
nothing else, it will show you that free will is not the
simple solution to many important theological issues that
many people think it is.
Two Definitions
I will be discussing two alternative definitions of free
will. The first is the typical definition demanded by
Arminians (those who believe that a free will choice to
believe brings about salvation): “The ability to choose
between options, either of which could be actualized by the
act of choosing.” The second definition was proposed by
Jonathan Edwards: “The ability to choose as one pleases.” I
will explain these in the pages that follow and defend the
second one. In so doing I will discuss several problems that
arise in seeking to understand free will.
Key Problems with Free will
Problem 1 – The Bible Does Not Directly Address Free will
Free will is assumed from passages that teach human
responsibility.
As we begin our discussion we confront our most important
problem: free will is never directly addressed in the Bible.
Even in passages where prophets and others asked God why He
allowed so much evil to harm the innocent, it was not
discussed. The answer was never that God was committed to
the principle of free will and determined that allowing evil
was a necessary by-product of free will.1 The will of humans
is discussed in the Bible and the New Testament has a Greek
word for it, but its relative freedom of choice is not
directly discussed. To derive our understanding we have to
go by implications from other Scriptures.
One lady wrote a long letter rebuking me for not teaching
free will to her satisfaction. I asked her to provide
scriptures that teach free will so I could discuss the
concept with her. She sent a long list of scriptures on
human responsibility. Her assumption was that if we are
responsible we must have free choice in the matter. 2 Many
people think the same way.
If we say that in order for a person to be responsible, that
person must be perfectly able to make correct choices to
obey God—it is the same as rejecting the teaching of the
Bible. The Bible teaches that humans are both responsible
for their sin and in bondage to their sin. It teaches that
God’s grace is necessary to deliver us from sin. If man were
free to perfectly choose obedience, then someone other than
Christ could have lived a sinless life and escape judgment
based on human merit. That idea denies Paul’s teaching in
Romans 3:9-18. Also, Paul teaches in Galatians 3 that the
command to obey all of the Law or be cursed proves that
those who are under the Law are cursed. Logically, if people
had the ability to obey the Law perfectly, then it would not
follow that being under the Law insured that they would be
cursed. But Paul said that it did. This provides a fatal
counterexample to any universal claim that responsibility
implies ability.
Charles Finney, the 19th century revivalist championed the
idea that Biblical passages about man’s moral responsibility
imply complete ability to perfectly obey God. Finney taught
perfectionism and created a heretical system of theology
called “moral government.” The following citation shows
Finney’s belief in human ability as a “first truth” of
reason:
Moral agency implies the possession of free will. By
free-will is intended the power of choosing, or refusing to
choose, in every instance, in compliance with moral
obligation. Free-will implies the power of originating and
deciding our own choices, and of exercising our own
sovereignty, in every instance of choice upon moral
questions of deciding or choosing in conformity with duty or
otherwise in all cases of moral obligation. That man cannot
be under a moral obligation to perform an absolute
impossibility is a first truth of reason. But man’s
causality, his whole power of causality to perform or do
anything, lies in his will. 3
This sounds logical to the unregenerate mind; but it is not
Biblical. Finney’s position is a reiteration of the Pelagian
heresy. It goes so far in the direction of human ability
that even Rome anathematized it at Trent: “If any one saith,
that the grace of God, through Jesus Christ, is given only
for this, that man may be able more easily to live justly,
and to merit eternal life, as if by free-will without grace,
he were able to do both, though hardly indeed and with
difficulty: let him be anathema.”4 Rome also anathematized
Luther’s opposite position on this, the bondage of the will:
“If any one saith, that, since Adam’s sin, the free-will of
man is lost and extinguished; or, that it is a thing with
only a name, yea a name without a reality, a figment, in
fine, introduced into the Church by Satan: let him be
anathema.”5 Roman Catholic theology is semi-Pelagian, which
it viewed as middle ground. That means Rome taught
“prevenient grace”: “If any one saith, that without the
prevenient inspiration of the Holy Ghost, and without his
help, man can believe, hope, love, or be penitent as he
ought, so that the grace of Justification may be bestowed
upon him: let him be anathema.”6
Summary Statement
Let me summarize the three basic positions on the will of
man in relationship to ability to choose to obey God: 1)
Pelagianism like that of Finney teaches that humans are
fully able to obey God without any special work of grace.
The mere presence of a command from God, they say, requires
the reality of free will ability to comply. 2) Semi-Pelagians
teach that without prevenient grace, man would not be able
to respond freely to the call to believe; but that God has
already provided such grace to all humans. “Prevenient” is
an old English term that means “to go before.” The semi-Pelagian
view is also synergistic—meaning that salvation and
sanctification are a cooperative effort between God and man.
3) Luther and the other reformers taught the bondage of the
will. This position, anathematized by Rome in several canons
on justification, was that all fallen sinners are in bondage
to their own sin so much so that they will not submit to God
without a prior sovereign work of God’s grace. This became
the Reformation doctrine of “grace alone,” also called “monergism.”
By this thinking salvation is an act of God alone. I agree
with Luther on this matter.
This Topic is Complex
Why is this topic so complex? It is complex because the
relative freedom or bondage of the will is different for
different types of people addressed in the Bible. For
example, the freedom of will that Adam and Eve had before
the Fall is surely different from the freedom or lack
thereof experienced by people born with a sin nature after
the Fall.7 Also, the relative freedom of will experienced by
a regenerate person differs from an unregenerate sinner.
Furthermore, consider the uniqueness of freedom for the
redeemed in heaven. Clearly these differences are important
to any discussion of the freedom or bondage of the will as
the case may be. Whatever definition of free will we defend
should account for these cases.
Most free will theology is based on philosophical
considerations that are imported to the discussion from
outside the Bible. Since the Bible does not directly discuss
the meaning of “free will,” the concept must be derived from
passages about human bondage to sin and human responsibility
and culpability before the Law of God. You will see this as
we examine literature on the topic. This complexity is why I
find simplistic demands for belief in “free will”
inappropriate. Those who make these demands have not
provided enough information to explain what we are required
to believe to be considered orthodox in their eyes.
Problem #2 Defining Free will
It might be surprising to many that defining free will is
controversial. Jonathan Edwards wrote a profound work on
this subject called: A Careful and Strict Enquiry into the
Modern Prevailing Notions of that Freedom of Will which is
supposed to be essential to Moral Agency, Virtue and Vice,
Reward and Punishment, Praise and Blame.”8 Though very
laborious reading, it is the best material I have found on
this issue. While in seminary I spent a lot of time
digesting Edward’s arguments so that I might understand the
issue of the relative freedom of the human will. What
follows contains some of the fruits of that effort.
I will provide an overview of Edward’s reasoning and
describe the process he used to define free will. He begins
by defining an act of the will: “The faculty of the will is
that faculty or power, or principle of minds, by which it is
capable of choosing: an act of the will is the same as an
act of choosing or choice.”9 Edward’s key premise is this:
“A man never, in any instance, wills any thing contrary to
his desires, or desires any thing contrary to his will.”10
These desires are determined by a man’s nature. After
contemplating Edwards’ writings on this, I decided that I
agree with him.
This brings us to Edward’s next consideration, the cause of
acts of the will. Are acts of the human will caused or
uncaused? Philosophers often discuss this topic. The short
answer is that the only uncaused being or thing in the
universe is God. Everything else has a previous cause. To
argue that acts of the will are uncaused, says Edwards, is
absurd. Then he deals with the challenge that acts of the
will are self-caused—which some have asserted. In reality
the soul determines acts of the will.11 However, when one
introduces the idea of self-determined acts of the will, one
just pushes the problem further back. Previous acts of the
will determine the conditions for future acts of the will.
This creates an infinite regress that must go back to some
initial uncaused cause. Writes Edwards, “But if that first
volition is not determined by a preceding act of the will,
then that act is not determined by the will and is not free
in the Arminian notion of freedom, which consists in the
will’s self-determination.”12 Edwards concludes, “Thus, this
Arminian notion of liberty of the will, consisting in the
will’s self-determination, is repugnant to itself, and
shouts itself wholly out of the world.”13 Infinite regresses
are always problematic.
Summary Statement
To summarize, those who assert absolute self-determining
freedom of the will have serious problems. Dependent human
beings, coming into the world with their own desires and
inclinations, will not choose contrary to their own natures.
For example, a person who utterly loathes beef liver (for
whatever reason) will not choose to eat it. Whatever it is
about that person’s nature that makes him hate liver, also
causes him to choose not to eat it. The human will does not
show up out of nowhere, uncaused, sovereign (to use Finney’s
term for it) and fully capable of self-determination.
Whatever makes a person the way he is causes him to choose
as he does.
To further summarize, asserting that acts of the will are
self-caused creates an infinite regress to some uncaused
beginning. When Edwards says that this uncaused beginning
defeats the Arminian definition, he means that their
definition requires that all acts of the will are
self-caused. But in reality, there is a chain of causes that
has to start somewhere and that beginning would be somewhere
other than in the will itself. This shows that their
definition does not work. Edwards demolishes the idea of
self-caused acts of the will and to my thinking does so
validly.
Further Discussion of Self-determination
Norman Geisler argues for self-determination when he states:
“Sooner or later those proposing this argument will have to
admit that a free act is a self-determined act that is not
caused by another.”14 Geisler claims to resolve the problem
by saying a person is the cause of his acts of the will.
This view grants sinners who are dependent of something
outside of themselves (God) for their own existence the
power of self-determination through choices that are somehow
disconnected from their own nature and their previous
choices. Geisler includes in his doctrine of
self-determination, “the ability to choose the opposite.”15
This ability is essential to the typical Arminian definition
of free will and was refuted by Edwards. Later we will show
that this definition does not fit God, the holy angels, or
the redeemed in heaven; all of whom we know to be free.
Edwards fully anticipated what he called “evasions” such as
those offered by Geisler.16 Having established that acts of
the will are choices, and these choices arise from the human
soul, Edwards argues that they are still caused, not
uncaused. Edwards wrote, “To say it is caused, influenced
and determined by something and yet not determined by any
thing antecedent, either in order of time or nature, is a
contradiction.”17 Pushing the cause back from the will to
the moral agent does not resolve the problem. What causes
the moral agent to choose as he does? Geisler asserts full
self-determination—the person is the sole cause of his own
choices. This would mean that humans have the ability to
escape from their own natures, desires, consequences of
previous choices, and every other influence that causes them
to choose as they do and with sovereign will-power make
self-determined choices.
In my opinion, Geisler is using a semantic slight of hand to
try to assert at one and the same time that human choices
are caused and uncaused. Edwards refuted those who did the
same in his day.18 Geisler claimed that the human soul being
the cause of free choices was the only cause necessary; so
did a writer in Edward’s day. Here is Edward’s rebuttal:
“The activity of the soul may enable it to be the cause of
effects; but it does not at all enable or help it be the
subject of effects that have no cause, which is the thing
this author supposes concerning acts of the will.”19 The
soul making a choice is not pristine (sovereignly free to
choose any option whatsoever without bias, reason or
motivation) and unaffected previous causes.
Luther also argued strongly against the type of philosophy
espoused by Geisler in our day and others in Luther’s day:
[T]hat is, a man void of the Spirit of God, does not evil
against his will as by violence, or as if he were taken by
the neck and forced to it, in the same way as a thief or
cut-throat is dragged to punishment against his will; but he
does it spontaneously, and with a desirous willingness. And
this willingness and desire of doing evil he cannot, by his
own power, leave off, restrain, or change; but it goes on
still desiring and craving. And even if he should be
compelled by force to do any thing outwardly to the
contrary, yet the craving will within remains averse to, and
rises in indignation against that which forces or resists
it.20
Luther’s view was central to the Reformation and the very
view anathematized by Trent. Geisler’s apparently semi-Pelagian
view is very much like Rome’s. Geisler also asserts
synergism (that salvation is a cooperative effort between
God and man).21 This is also a rejection of a key doctrine
of the Reformation and certainly is a rejection of “grace
alone.” Luther wrote, “And hence it follows, that
‘Free-will,’ without the grace of God is, absolutely, not
FREE; but, immutably, the servant and bond-slave of evil;
because, it cannot turn itself unto good.”22 I agree with
Luther and Edwards that choices are caused by the nature and
desires of the person choosing. Only God’s grace can change
that, not some supposed principle of self-determination.
Summary Statement
The soul of the person determines what the person chooses. A
person chooses according to what appears the most desirable.
What appears most desirable is determined by the nature of
the person holding the desires. When Norman Geisler and
other Arminians23 claim that choices are self-determined and
need no other cause, they are dissociating the choice from
the nature of the person making it. However, the “self” that
chooses is not sovereign and self-caused, only God is that.
The reason Arminians argue for self-determination and
choices that are self-caused is that they want to argue that
fallen sinners are free to choose to obey God in spite of
their sin nature. Luther and Edwards show that the sinner
chooses sin because it is his nature to do so.
More on Defining Free will
We still need further discussion about the definition of
free will. Edwards next dealt with the Arminian objection
that there can be a state of indifference in the soul out of
which the will is able to sovereignly choose. Edwards dealt
with that by pointing out that if the will does make a
choice, at that point of choice it cannot be called
“indifferent.” Edwards wrote, “Choice and preference can no
more be in a state of indifference, than motion can be in a
state of rest, or than the preponderation of the scale of a
balance can be in a state of equilibrium.”24 He called a
choice made out of total indifference a “contradiction” and
“absurdity,” thus rejecting a definition proposed by some
Arminians in his day.25
Edwards, after lengthy argumentation, offers a definition of
an act of the will: “[E]very act of the will is some way
connected with the understanding, and is as the greatest
apparent good is, in the manner which has already been
explained; namely, that the soul always wills or chooses
that which, in the present view of the mind, considered in
the whole of that view, and all that belongs to it, appears
most agreeable.”26 Citing Arminian objections to this
principle which seek to disassociate acts of the will from
the understanding in order to make them fully “free,”
Edwards charges them with inconsistency:
And if so, in vain are all the applications to the
understanding, in order to induce to any free virtuous act;
and so in vain are all instructions, counsels, invitations,
expostulations, and all arguments and persuasives
whatsoever; for these are but applications to the
understanding, and a clear and lively exhibition of the
objects of choice to the mind’s view. But if, after all, the
will must be self-determined, and independent on the
understanding, to what purpose are things thus represented
to the understanding, in order to determine the choice.27
So if total, undetermined, sovereign freedom of choice,
disconnected from previous causes or states of the soul is
the great good of the universe as asserted by some Arminians
-- then why try to convince people to change their minds and
make different choices? Doing so shows a belief that the
state of a person’s mind or soul determines their choices,
which is the very doctrine that Edwards asserted and
Arminians reject.
Having established that an uncaused act of the will is
impossible and that pushing the cause back to the human soul
does not alleviate the problem, Edwards concludes: “And as
it is in a manner self-evident, that there can be no act of
will, choice, or preference of the mind, without some motive
or inducement, something in the mind’s view, which it aims
at, seeks, inclines to, and goes after; so it is most
manifest, there is no such liberty in the universe as
Arminians insist on; nor any such thing possible or
conceivable.”28
Summary Statement
To summarize Edward’s argument thus far: 1) All acts of the
will have causes. 2) Acts of the will arise from the human
soul according to its own desires and nature. 3) Acts of the
will are determined by whatever appears most desirous at the
moment by the person choosing.
By the Arminian Definition of Freedom, God Would Not Be Free
A key problem with the type of definition of freedom
espoused by theologians like Norm Geisler in our day, and
others in Edwards’ day, is that it cannot apply to God
Himself and other moral agents such as holy angels and the
redeemed in heaven. This is a problem because the definition
they propose demands the ability to choose the contrary—when
there is such a choice between options, either one could be
actualized. They argue for this definition on this basis: it
is the only definition that makes moral agents praiseworthy
or blameworthy (remember that Edwards used the terms “praise
and blame” in his long title). Why do they make this claim?
They assume that if a moral agent had no option but to do
good or to do evil, that agent could not be praised or
blamed for what exists as a matter of necessity. They would
consider that as foolish as blaming a leopard for having
spots.
Again, Edwards takes on this argument in a full and
compelling manner. The simple form of Edwards’ rebuttal is
that God Himself, because of His own perfect, holy and
virtuous nature, cannot be anything but holy and just. The
Bible says “God cannot lie.”29 Since the Arminian definition
of freedom requires the real option of choosing the
contrary, God is not “free” because His nature determines
that He must be truthful. Likewise, if this definition were
to hold, God would not be praiseworthy for His holy virtues
because the real possibility of choosing and actualizing the
contrary does not exist for God.
I cannot resist the opportunity to share with my readers
some vintage Edwards, including his aversion to periods:
So that, putting these things together, the infinitely holy
God, who always used to be esteemed by God’s people not only
virtuous, but a Being in whom is all possible virtue, and
every virtue in the most absolute purity and perfection, and
in infinitely greater brightness and amiableness than in any
creature: the most perfect pattern of virtue, and the
fountain from whom all others, virtue is but as beams from
the sun; and who has been supposed to be, on the account of
his virtue and holiness, infinitely more worthy to be
esteemed, loved, honored, admired, commended, extolled, and
praised, than any creature: and he who is thus every where
represented in Scripture; I say, this Being, according to
this notion of Dr. Whithy, and other Arminians, has no
virtue at all: virtue, when ascribed to him, is but an empty
name; and he is deserving of no commendation or praise;
because he is under necessity, he cannot avoid being holy
and good as he is; therefore no thanks to him for it.30
Since this common Arminian definition of freedom logically
leads to an absurdity (according to Edwards) it must be
rejected.
It could be argued that the term “freedom” when predicated
of God is not the same as when predicated of a human being.
This, of course, is true of other attributes of God. When it
is said that God is holy, it is not univocally the same as
saying an angel is holy, or a person who is saved is holy.
But there is a valid analogical relationship that still
holds. God as being God, is holy according to his order of
being; holy angels, though created and deriving their
holiness from God, nevertheless are holy as is fitting for
their order of being.
Therefore, freedom that a person has is analogically related
to freedom that God has. For example, consider the redeemed
in heaven. We know that the redeemed in heaven are free from
sin. Let us apply the Arminian definition of freedom of the
will to the redeemed in heaven. Are they fully able to
choose between options, either of which could be actualized
in reality? Being informed by the Bible that the redeemed
shall have the type of holiness necessary for living
perfectly in God’s presence for all eternity, we have to
answer that they will not have the freedom to choose the
contrary. There is no real chance the redeemed in heaven
will ever choose to sin. This being the case, the
aforementioned definition of freedom would not apply to the
redeemed in heaven either.
Edwards also argued that if it is countered that God is
indeed worthy of praise though He is necessarily holy and
upright, but that humans have to make themselves
praiseworthy through free choices, then man has a greater
claim to esteem and commendation than God does.31 This too
is absurd. Edwards puts forth many similar examples and
arguments, including the holiness of Christ in His
incarnation, to show that the Arminian definition of free
will is untenable and fails to account for what we know to
be true from the Scriptures. He also deals with the obverse
of this: that sinners must be able to choose not to sin if
they are to be blamed for their own evil. He gives many
examples from the Scripture that sinners such as Judas who
are given over to sin through the judgment of reprobation,
are nevertheless blameworthy for their sinful condition.32
Luther argued that the only truly free being in the universe
is God. Wrote Luther, “It now then follows, that free-will
is plainly a divine term, and can be applicable to none but
the divine Majesty only: for He alone ‘doth, (as the Psalm
sings), what He will in Heaven and earth.’”33 Most certainly
we need a definition of free will that applies to the one
truly free being in the universe!
D. A. Carson claims that a definition of free will that
includes the ability to actualize the contrary possibility
is not compatible with God’s sovereignty. Carson writes, “If
its [free will’s] essence is the absolute power to contrary,
a logical contradiction is entailed when this absolute power
to contrary is coupled with a divine providence which in
some sense foreordains all things with certainty.”34 Carson
concludes that the definition that requires the “absolute
power to the contrary” cannot be maintained in light of the
Biblical material he discusses.35
Summary Statement
I will not labor any longer over this point that Edwards
makes so well. The definition of freedom of the will that
requires the real ability to choose the contrary and the
possibility of that contrary choice being actualized fails
to account for what is stated in the Bible. If a reprobate
sinner is powerless to choose holiness and virtue, his sin
is still blameworthy. If the righteous in heaven have no
desire or opportunity to choose sin and evil, their holy
estate is still praiseworthy. The same goes for God Himself
and the holy angels. If Satan has neither desire,
opportunity, nor ability to choose good and virtue, Satan is
still blameworthy for his evil. If humans born after the
nature of Adam had no opportunity to choose to be born
sinless, they are nevertheless blameworthy for their sin. I
make these statements in light of what we know the Bible
teaches. Since the definition of freedom that Arminians
typically assert fails to account for these realities, the
definition must be rejected.
A Simple Alternative
Edward’s proposed a most simple solution to this debate. He
proposed a simple definition of freedom: “the ability to do
as one pleases.” He states this fact: “The plain and obvious
meaning of the words freedom and liberty, in common speech,
is power, opportunity, or advantage, that any one has to do
as he pleases.”36 He pointed out the obvious fact that
“freedom” is something a person who has a will has, not
something the will itself has: “That which has the power of
volition or choice, is the man or the soul, and not the
power of volition itself.”37 So if a person has the
opportunity to choose whatever seems best to him, he is
thereby freely exercising his volition.
Summary Statement
Edwards’ simple definition of freedom of the will is the
ability to choose as one pleases. This definition, along
with the definition that a person chooses according to his
greatest desire at the moment, resolves the many problems
that the Arminian definition created. Now, God is free
because He freely chooses all that is holy and virtuous from
His perfectly holy nature. The same goes for holy angels and
the redeemed in heaven. Likewise all other moral agents are
free to choose as they see fit, including the wicked.
The Underlying Concern
Why would anyone reject this simple solution? The answer
lies in certain theological priorities. If this definition
is accepted, then it would follow that no sinner would ever
choose to come to God on His terms: “because the mind set on
the flesh is hostile toward God; for it does not subject
itself to the law of God, for it is not even able to do so;
and those who are in the flesh cannot please God” (Romans
8:7, 8). If this be true, then Luther’s position against
Rome that salvation is fully an act of God is true because
the dead sinner is not about to cooperate in his own
salvation. This idea is as repulsive to many evangelicals
today as it was to the Roman Catholic Church when Luther
first taught it. But what really matters is what the Bible
says.
Implications
Free will is not the simple answer to important theological
questions that people think it is. It raises more questions
and complications than it answers. I set about to study this
matter in great detail over ten years ago. I read the best
material I could find, much of it sited in this article. The
bottom line for me is that we need to accept what the Bible
teaches and not try to escape from clear Biblical passages
through philosophical speculation. I am not minimizing the
sincere desire people have to answer the difficult question
about God’s relationship to time, evil, and human choices.
But I am saying that outside of Divine revelation in
Scripture there are true mysteries.
People, for example, want to know why Adam and Eve sinned.
The doctrine of free will that many cherish is deemed the
obvious answer. I would affirm that Adam and Eve freely
chose to rebel against God. Some suggest that this proves
God’s ultimate commitment to the principle of
self-determination. But the Bible does not teach that God is
committed to a principle of creaturely self-determination
that explains the whole history of sin and redemption. If
God left all sinners the full power of self-determination,
then all would be damned. We need to be delivered by God out
of our self-determined course on the road to hell.
But, back to the question, why did Adam and Eve sin? Let’s
push the question back further. Why did God allow the
Serpent into the Garden? Why did not God utterly destroy
Satan when he first rebelled? The Bible does not say.
Whatever is not revealed is a mystery, and the answers to
the last two of these questions are mysteries.
How could it be that Adam and Eve, being created good by a
good God, chose to do evil? Doesn’t that violate Edward’s
definition of choosing what one desires? The real question
from Edwards’ perspective would be: Where did Adam and Eve
get such a desire, being innocent? They obviously had the
desire or they would not have acted on it. Since the Bible
only explains this in terms of the Serpent enticing Eve to
question God’s word, we must accept that answer. What is not
revealed is rightly described as “mystery.”
Some argue that if God could have kept Adam and Eve from
sinning He would be morally obligated to do so. He did not,
so obviously God was incapable of keeping Adam and Eve from
sinning because if He did He would have violated the right
of self-determination of the creature. Do you realize how
many unbiblical presumptions this thinking involves? Where
does the Bible say God is morally obligated to keep His
creatures from sinning if He has the power to do so? That is
a philosophical premise that is not taught in Scripture.
Where does the Bible teach that God has obligated Himself to
the principle of the creature’s right to self-determination?
That is a philosophical premise that is not taught in
Scripture. Where does the Bible assert that evil is due to
some inability in God to prevent it? It does not; that is
philosophical speculation not taught in Scripture.
I am not saying that it is wrong to ask philosophical
questions and to seek their answers. I am saying that it is
wrong to demand that other Christians believe what one
teaches under pains of being declared heretical or
unbiblical based on philosophical questions not raised or
answered in Scripture. That is precisely what prompted me to
write this article. At the very least, consider what the
Bible teaches:
Just as He chose us in Him before the foundation of the
world, that we should be holy and blameless before Him. In
love He predestined us to adoption as sons through Jesus
Christ to Himself, according to the kind intention of His
will, to the praise of the glory of His grace, which He
freely bestowed on us in the Beloved. (Ephesians 1:4-6)
Would it not be kind and charitable to allow Christians to
literarily believe what this says without being forced to
redefine it based on someone’s philosophical speculations?
Conclusion
I share this discussion to further demonstrate how
exceedingly complex the discussion of free will is when
engaged in from a philosophical perspective. I want to
emphasize again, this is a philosophical discussion about
matters that the Biblical writers appeared to be unconcerned
about. Secular writers and philosophers often address the
issue of free will. For example, consider the following from
Stephen Hawking, the famous scientist who wrote A Brief
History of Time:
Of course, you could say that free will is an illusion
anyway. If there really is a complete theory of physics that
governs everything, it presumably also determines your
actions. . . . So one way to look at it is that we say
humans have free will because we cannot predict what they
do. However, if a human goes off in a rocket ship and comes
back before he set off, we will be able to predict what he
will do because it will be part of recorded history. Thus in
that situation, the time traveler would not in any sense
have free will.38
Philosophers advance a similar argument only concerning
God’s foreknowledge. If God foreknows all things, then all
things have been certain since before the foundation of the
world. Somewhere we have to leave off philosophical
speculation and accept the testimony of Scripture. I
appreciate D. A. Carson’s appeal to Scripture and suggestion
that it teaches both Divine sovereignty and human
responsibility.
I am bemused when I hear Arminians suggesting that so-called
“Calvinists” are always bringing philosophical
considerations to the table. What they do not realize is
that their free will idea is philosophical. Philosophers
with no interest in theology discuss it constantly.
Conversely, monergism and synergism are purely theological
issues. Secular philosophers have no concern whether
salvation is an act of God alone, or a cooperative effort
between man and God.
Edwards’ simple definition of free will gives us a great
starting point to discuss the matter of God’s grace in
salvation. If everyone is free to choose according to his or
her own desires and nature, then how does a sinner choose to
come to God on His terms? The answer has to do with God’s
sovereign grace.
We need to decide between the Roman Catholic doctrine of
synergism, and the doctrine of “grace alone” taught by the
Reformation. This debate centers on the issue of human
ability or human inability as the case may be. The next CIC
article will explore issues about salvation and whether it
is an act of God, or a cooperative effort. I will further
defend the idea that the whole human being, including the
faculty of the will, is in bondage to sin and death and is
incapable of extracting himself out of it. Salvation is an
act of God alone.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
End Notes
See Bob DeWaay; The Hebrew Lament and the Problem of Evil;
Critical Issues Commentary issue 64: http://cicministry.org/commentary/issue64.htm
The passages she cited are: Genesis 3:17; Genesis 4:17;
Hosea 8:4; John 15:6; Romans 2:28; Romans 8:7, 8 (which is
ironic since these verses teach human inability); Romans
11:19; and John 3:16. None of these passages directly
mention the human will.
Charles G. Finney, Systematic Theology, Lecture 2
"Conditions for Moral Obligation” 25, from Books For The
Ages, AGES Software, version 8.0 [CD-ROM] (Rio WI: The
Master Christian Library Series, 2000).
Council of Trent, Canons on Justification, Canon II.
Council of Trent, Canons on Justification, Canon V.
Council of Trent, Canons on Justification, Canon III.
Pelagius denied that the sin nature was passed down from
Adam to his descendents. http://www.passionforgrace.org.uk/doctrine3.html
This was written in 1754 and is usually referred to as “The
Freedom of the Will.”
Jonathan Edwards A Careful and Strict Inquiry . . ., from
Books For The Ages, AGES Software, version 8.0 [CD-ROM] (Rio
WI: The Master Christian Library Series, 2000). 8.
Ibid. 10.
Ibid. 37.
Ibid. 38.
Ibid. 39.
Norman Geisler, Chosen But Free – A Balanced View of Divine
Election, (Bethany House: Minneapolis, 1999) 177.
Ibid. 176.
I have benefited greatly by many of Norman Geisler’s books
and teachings. That I am disagreeing with him on this point
should not be taken to mean I do not appreciate and respect
Geisler, because I do. However, in Chosen But Free his
theological prejudices appear to cloud is usual logical
brilliance.
Edwards, 40.
Here is how he shows their contradictions: “If there be an
act of the will in determining all its own free acts, then
one free act of the will is determined by another; and so we
have the absurdity of every free act, even the very first,
determined by a foregoing free act. But if there be no act
or exercise of the will in determining its own acts, then no
liberty is exercised in determining them. From whence it
follows, that no liberty consists in the will’s power to
determine its own acts; or, which is the same thing, that
there is no such thing as liberty consisting in a
self-determining power of the will.” Ibid. 41.
Ibid. 51.
Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will, (Baker: Grand
Rapids, 1976) 72, 73.
Geisler, 233.
Luther, 75.
Geisler denies he is an Arminian and calls himself a
“moderate Calvinist.” Calvinists nevertheless consider his
doctrine Arminian. I am calling him that because of his
defense of synergism.
Edwards, 67.
Ibid. 72.
Ibid. 76.
Ibid. 82, 83.
Ibid. 95.
Titus 1:2
Edwards, 131.
Ibid.
Ibid. 147, 148.
Luther, 76. The passage he cites is this: “Whatever the Lord
pleases, He does, In heaven and in earth, in the seas and in
all deeps” (Psalm 135:6).
D. A. Carson Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility –
Biblical Perspectives in Tension; (Baker: Grand Rapids,
1981; 1994 edition) 206.
Ibid. 209.
Luther 32.
Ibid. 33.
Stephen Hawking with Leonard Mlodinow, A Briefer History of
Time; (Bantam: London, 2005) 115.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Copyright © 1992-2005 Critical Issues Commentary
Copyright © 1992-2005 Twin City
Fellowship
Please
read the rest the of this much-needed message at
http://cicministry.org/commentary/issue92.htm
Bob DeWaay is
the Pastor of
Twin City Fellowship, a
non-denominational evangelical Church in Minneapolis, MN,
which tells us:
"We are a
body of believers who attempt to live our Christian
faith according to Acts 2:42 by devoting ourselves to
prayer, fellowship, searching the Scriptures, and the
Lord’s Supper.
"Our mission is to equip the saints for the work of
ministry and to reach the lost with the Gospel of Jesus
Christ. We do this through expository preaching, study
of the Scriptures, publications, our website and
neighborhood outreaches."
1. http://www.purposedriven.com/en-US/AboutUs/WhoWeAre/Welcome.htm
2. ibid.
3. ibid.
6. This phrase is found at the conclusion of the message to
each of the seven churches. It is a call to listen to God
who is speaking authoritatively to His people.
23. George Eldon Ladd, Commentary on the Revelation of John
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1972) 56.
27. See Ryan Habbena’s article
published in CIC issue 59: http://www.twincityfellowship.com/cic/articles/issue59.pdf;
Ryan corrects this misinterpretation.
39. Rick Warren, The Purpose Driven Life, (Zondervan: Grand
Rapids, 2002) 34.